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Informationen zum Autor Aviad Heifetz is Professor of Economics at the Open University of Israel, where he served as chair of the Economics and Management Department from 2006 to 2009. He was previously Visiting Professor of Managerial Economics at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University (2009–2011). Klappentext "Social interaction is essential to human life. How do people choose what to do when they encounter one another? And how do organizations, firms or countries interact? Game Theory is a modeling tool designed to represent and analyze such strategic interaction. The first part of this book is devoted to introducing the basic building blocks of game theory. The parties to the interaction are called players, the courses of actions available to them are their strategies, and the payoffs of each player from the various profiles of strategies (of all players) represent the way each player ranks the possible outcomes of the interaction from her own individual point of view"-- Zusammenfassung A guide to the fundamentals of game theory that lets examples lead the way to the concepts needed to solve them. It provides opportunities for self-study and self-testing through an extensive pedagogical apparatus and also includes more advanced material suitable as a basis for seminar papers or elective topics. Inhaltsverzeichnis Part I. Strategic Interactions as Games: 1. Strategic form games; 2. Representing strategic interactions with games; Part II. Basic Solution Concepts for Strategic-Form Games: 3. Dominant strategies; 4. Strongly dominated strategies; 5. Weakly dominated strategies; 6. Nash equilibrium; Part III. Prominent Classes of Strategic-Form Games: 7. Cooperation and conflict, strategic complements and substitutes; 8. Concentrated markets; 9. Coordination games and strategic uncertainty; Part IV. Uncertainty and Mixed Strategies: 10. Choice under uncertainty and risk dominance; 11. Mixed strategies; 12. Security strategies, strictly competitive games and the minimax theorem; 13. Mixed strategies in general games; Part V. Advanced Topics in Strategic Form Games: 14. Rationalizable strategies; 15. Stability of equilibria; 16. Games and evolution; 17. Global games; Part VI. Dynamic Games: 18. Extensive form games; 19. Non-credible threats, subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction; 20. Commitment; 21. Backward induction: limitations and difficulties; 22. Moves of nature; Part VII. Repeated Games: 23. The repeated prisoner's dilemma; 24. Games with unbounded horizon: additional models and results....
