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Informationen zum Autor Scott Gehlbach is Professor of Political Science! Lyons Family Faculty Fellow and Romnes Faculty Fellow at the University of Wisconsin! Madison; Senior Research Fellow at the International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development at the Higher School of Economics! Moscow; and Research Associate of the Center for Economic and Financial Research at the New Economic School in Moscow. A specialist in Russia! Professor Gehlbach has made fundamental contributions to the study of economic reform! authoritarianism and accountability in organizations and government. Known for employing a wide range of research methods in his work! Gehlbach is the author of the award-winning Representation through Taxation: Revenue! Politics! and Development in Postcommunist States (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) and numerous articles in top journals! including the American Political Science Review! the American Journal of Political Science and The Journal of Politics. His work has been supported by two Fulbright-Hays Fellowships and many other grants. Professor Gehlbach received his PhD in political science and economics from the University of California! Berkeley. Klappentext A unified and accessible treatment of important formal models of domestic politics appropriate for students in political science and economics. Zusammenfassung Intended for students in political science and economics who have already taken a course in game theory! this text provides a unified and accessible survey of canonical and important new formal models of domestic politics. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Electoral competition under certainty; 2. Electoral competition under uncertainty; 3. Special interest; 4. Veto players; 5. Delegation; 6. Coalitions; 7. Political agency; 8. Regime change.
