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Klappentext J. Howard Sobel has long been recognised as an important figure in philosophical discussions of rational decision. He has done much to help formulate the concept of causal decision theory. In this volume of essays Sobel explores the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximise expected values! where an action's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. Newcomb’s Problem and The Prisoner’s Dilemma are discussed! and Allais-type puzzles are viewed from the perspective of causal world Bayesianism. The author establishes principles for distinguishing options in decision problems! and studies ways in which perfectly rational causal maximisers can be capable of resolute choices. Several of the essays concern games! with interacting ideally rational and well-informed maximising rationality. Sobel also views critically Gauthier’s revisionist ideas about maximising rationality. This collection will be a desideratum for anyone working in the field of rational choice theory! whether in philosophy! economics! political science! psychology! or statistics. Howard Sobel’s work in decision theory is certainly among the most important! interesting! and challenging that is being done by philosophers. Zusammenfassung In this volume of essays Sobel explores the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values! where an action's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. Inhaltsverzeichnis Preface; Part I. World Bayesianism: 1. Utility and the Bayesian paradigm; Part II. Problems for Evidential Decision Theory: 2. Newcomblike problems; 3. Not every prisoners' dilemma is a Newcomb problem; 4. Some versions of Newcomb's problem are prisoners' dilemmas; 5. Infallible predictors; 6. Kent Bach on good arguments; 7. Maximising and prospering; Part III. Causal Decision Theory: 8. Notes on decision theory: old wine in new bottles; 9. Partition theorems for causal decision theories; 10. Expected utilities and rational actions and choices; 11. Maximisation, stability of decision and actions in accordance with reason; 12. Useful intentions; Part IV. Interacting Causal Maximisers: 13. The need for coercion; 14. Hyperrational games; 15. Utility maximizers in iterated prisoners' dilemmas; 16. Backward induction arguments: a paradox regained; References; Index of names....
