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Zusatztext "Serena employs a blend of technical analysis! in his assessment of the inner workings of complex covert networks! and empirical examples! which he draws from the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. This approach is successful in providing insight into the nature of the organizational adaptation of the Iraqi insurgency as well as in laying a framework for the future study of similarly organized martial groups . . . Serena's technical descriptions of organizational inputs and outputs in the early chapters is insightful and provides an academic audience with a foundation for future study of covert martial networks similar to the Iraqi insurgency . . . It Takes More than a Network is a convincingly argued and well-written book that provides a good deal of insight into the essential functions and adaptive capability of martially oriented covert networks." Informationen zum Autor Chad Serena is a Political Scientist with the RAND Corporation. Klappentext Chad Serena is a Political Scientist with the RAND Corporation. Zusammenfassung It Takes More than a Network presents a structured investigation of the Iraqi insurgency's capacity for and conduct of organizational adaptation. In particular, it answers the question of why the Iraqi insurgency was seemingly so successful between 2003 and late 2006 and yet nearly totally collapsed by 2008. The book's main argument is that the Iraqi insurgency failed to achieve longer-term organizational goals because many of its organizational strengths were also its organizational weaknesses: these characteristics abetted and then corrupted the Iraqi insurgency's ability to adapt. The book further compares the organizational adaptation of the Iraqi insurgency with the organizational adaptation of the Afghan insurgency. This is done to refine the findings of the Iraq case and to present a more robust analysis of the adaptive cycles of two large and diverse covert networked insurgencies. The book finds that the Afghan insurgency, although still ongoing, has adapted more successfully than the Iraqi insurgency because it has been better able to leverage the strengths and counter the weaknesses of its chosen organizational form. ...
