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and Statement of Purpose.- 1 The Inefficacy of Profit Level Regulation for the Natural Monopoly Markets of Diversified Firms.- A. An Economic Overview.- 1. Economic Rationale for Regulation.- 2. Economic Goals of Natural Monopoly Regulation.- 3. Incentives Under Rate of Return Regulation.- B. A Legal Overview.- 1. A View from the MFJ: A Selective Approach to Intermarket Subsidies.- 2. A View from the FCC: Cost Allocation and Transfer Pricing.- 3. A View from the States: Transfer Pricing.- 4. The Uses and Abuses of ¿Stand Alone¿ Costs.- 5. Regulating the Structure of Diversified Utilities Under Profit Level Regulation.- 6. Summary: Profit Level Regulation and Diversification.- 2 The Welfare Ingredients of Price Level Regulation: Incentives and Decisional Options.- A. The Firm¿s Incentives and their Welfare Implications.- B. Major Decisional Issues in a Price Level Regime.- 1. Defining the Market Scope of a Price Level Regime.- 2. Determining Initial Price Levels.- a. Aggregate Levels.- b. Price Relationships.- 3. Price Level Adjustments.- a. Programmed Adjustments: Inflation and Productivity.- b. Non-Programmed Adjustments: Material and Irregular Exogenous Cost Changes.- c. Adjusting for Differential Costs and Demand Factors.- 4. Price Structure and Relationships: Aggregate and Disaggregate Ceilings.- 3 Assessing the Efficacy of Price Level Regulation for the Natural Monopoly Markets of Diversified Firms.- A. Potential Benefits of Price Level Regulation.- 1. Productive Efficiency and Innovation in Natural Monopoly Markets.- 2. Allocative Efficiency.- a. Pricing in Natural Monopoly Markets.- b. Pricing and Output in Unregulated Markets.- 3. Reducing the Costs of Regulation.- B. Potential Problems of Price Level Regulation.- 1. Potential Pricing Problems.- 2. Potential Problems of Service Coverage and Quality.- 3. The Potential Problem Of Errant Indices.- 4. Potential Limitations on Efficiency from Oversight Standards and Monitoring Procedures.- 5. Problems in Defining the Constitutional Entitlements of Investors and Consumers Under a Price Level Regime.- 4 Implementing a Price Level Regime for Diversified Public Utilities.- A. As Applied to the Firm¿s Natural Monopoly Markets.- 1. Structuring an Efficient Process for Efficacious Decisions.- 2. Maintaining Efficiency Incentives Through Minimal Recourse to Profit Level Standards.- B. As Applied to Relationships between the Diversified Firm¿s Regulated and Unregulated Markets.- 1. Responsibilities of the Diversified Firm for the Provision of Natural Monopoly Services.- 2. The Regulator¿s Antitrust Role in the Diversified Firm¿s ¿Unregulated¿ Markets.- Conclusion.- Endnotes.- Afterword.
List of contents
and Statement of Purpose.- 1 The Inefficacy of Profit Level Regulation for the Natural Monopoly Markets of Diversified Firms.- A. An Economic Overview.- B. A Legal Overview.- 2 The Welfare Ingredients of Price Level Regulation: Incentives and Decisional Options.- A. The Firm's Incentives and their Welfare Implications.- B. Major Decisional Issues in a Price Level Regime.- 3 Assessing the Efficacy of Price Level Regulation for the Natural Monopoly Markets of Diversified Firms.- A. Potential Benefits of Price Level Regulation.- B. Potential Problems of Price Level Regulation.- 4 Implementing a Price Level Regime for Diversified Public Utilities.- A. As Applied to the Firm's Natural Monopoly Markets.- B. As Applied to Relationships between the Diversified Firm's Regulated and Unregulated Markets.- Conclusion.- Endnotes.- Afterword.
About the author
Ronald R. Braeutigam is the Harvey Kapnick Professor of Business Institutions in the Department of Economics at Northwestern University. He is Associate Dean for Undergraduate Studies in the Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences. He received a BS in Petroleum Engineering from the University of Tulsa in 1970 and then attended Stanford University and the California Institute of Technology, and he has also held an appointment as a Senior Research Fellow at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (Science Center Berlin). He has also worked in both government and industry, beginning his career as a petroleum engineer with Standard Oil of Indiana (now BP), serving as research economist in The White House office of Telecommunications Policy, and as an economic consultant to Congress, many government agencies and private firms on matters of pricing, costing, managerial strategy, antitrust, and regulation.
