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Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
List of contents
- 1: Introduction
- PART I: HISTORY
- 2: Hume: Projectivist, Realist, and Error Theorist
- 3: Hÿgerström: Projectivist, Non-Cognitivist, and Error Theorist
- 4: Other Precursors of Moral Error Theory
- PART II: CRITIQUE
- 5: How to Understand Mackie's Argument from Queerness (I)
- 6: How to Understand Mackie's Argument from Queerness (II)
- 7: Debunking Moral Belief
- PART III: DEFENCE
- 8: Ramifications of Moral Error Theory
- 9: Moral Error Theory, and Then What?
About the author
Jonas Olson is Reader in Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University. He received his PhD from Uppsala University in 2005. In 2005-2008 he was a Fellow at Brasenose College and Departmental Lecturer in Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford. He has held visiting positions at the University of Otago, CEPPA (Centre for Ethics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs) at the University of St Andrews, and at Université de Montréal. Olson works mainly in metaethics, value theory, and history of moral philosophy. He is co-editor with Iwao Hirose of The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory (OUP USA, forthcoming) and he has published several articles in peer-reviewed collections and journals, such as such as Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Hume Studies, Mind, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophy and Phenomenological esearch, Ratio, and Utilitas.
Summary
Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
Additional text
I enjoyed reading Olson's book. It is interesting and clearly written, suitable both for upper-level undergraduates and more advanced students of philosophy. . . . I can recommend it unreservedly.
