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After the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the United States became deeply involved in Greek affairs. By 1952, however, the pro-Western government of Marshal Papagos began to support the nationalist ''Enosis'' movement in Cyprus and called for an end to British colonial rule in the island. The opposition of the US, Britain and Turkey to these demands brought Greece face-to-face with its closest allies at the United Nations in 1954 and led to the outbreak of the first major crisis within NATO since its creation. examines these developments from the novel perspective of critical international theory and exposes the unexplored connections between dependence and nationalism in Greek foreign policy. Drawing on a wide range of American, British and Greek archival sources, it argues that nationalism and compliance with the collective interests of NATO were two irreconcilable objectives in Greek foreign policy after 1952. At the same time, the book tells the story of how the post-Civil War governments of Greece, for a variety of political, cultural and ideological reasons, treated these two objectives as essentially compatible, resulting in the adoption of a dualist policy. This self-contradictory diplomatic doctrine, which the author refers to as "dependent nationalism", lies at the heart of Greece''s post-War failures both to emancipate its politics from US intervention and to peacefully end its regional dispute with Turkey over Cyprus.The book deploys an interdisciplinary approach which brings together the diverse perspectives of diplomatic history, foreign policy analysis and political sociology.>
