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Informationen zum Autor By Mike Potter Klappentext This book is an applied study of regulatory policymaking. It investigates the qualities that make regulators effective and concludes that effective regulators balance a public interest orientation with openness towards their regulated communities. Zusammenfassung This book is an applied study of regulatory policymaking. It investigates the qualities that make regulators effective and concludes that effective regulators balance a public interest orientation with openness towards their regulated communities. Inhaltsverzeichnis Chapter 1: IntroductionStatement of the ProblemFigure 1.1: Total Assets Under Supervision, 1998 through 2008Figure 1.2: Mentions in the Congressional Committee Reports by Agency, 1995 through 2008Research QuestionRegulatory EffectivenessFigure 1.3: Failure Rates Expressed as Percentage of Regulated Institutions by Agency, 1998 through 2008Understanding Bank Failure: The Case of Superior Bank Agency Relationships with their Regulated CommunitiesFigure 1.4 Ideal Regulatory Agency PolicymakingUnderstanding Self-funding and Charter CompetitionOverview of StudyChapter 2: The Challenge of Distilling and Examining a Theory of Regulatory EffectivenessTable 2.1: Selected Scholarship on Regulatory EffectivenessWorking Model of Regulatory Effectiveness Figure 2.1: Working Model of Regulatory Effectiveness Regulatory EffectivenessPropositionsStudy Design Table 2.2: Agency ComparisonThe Agencies National Credit Union Administration Office of Thrift Supervision Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Other RegulatorsOperationalizations, Data, and Data AnalysisTable 2.3: Empirical Examination: Concepts, Variables, and Data Sources Chapter 3: The Impact of Agency Longevity on Financial Services Regulatory EffectivenessTable 3.1: Relationships Between Longevity and Financial Resources by AgencyOverview of the Statistical ModelsAgency Longevity and FailuresTable 3.2: Impact of Agency Age on Failures of Regulated InstitutionsConclusionChapter 4: The Impact of Ability to Manage Political Complexity, Front-line Employees,and Political Appointee Turnover on Regulatory EffectivenessCongressional Attention and Front-line StaffTable 4.1: Impact of Congressional Attention and Percentage of Examiners on the Failures of Regulatory Institutions Congressional AttentionFigure 4.1: Congressional Testimony by Agency, 1999 through 2008Table 4.2: Relationships Between Congressional Attention and Effectiveness Front-line StaffFigure 4.2: Percentages of Examiners by Agency, 1998 through 2008Table 4.3: Ratios of Examiners per Regulated Institutions by Agency, 1998 to 2008A Narrative Analysis of Political Appointee TurnoverTable 4.4: NCUA Political Appointees, 1989 through 2008Table 4.5: OTS Political Appointees, 1989 through 2008Table 4.6: OCC Political Appointees, 1989 through 2008Figure 4.3: Number of Changes in Political Appointees by Agency, 1989 through 2008Table 4.7: Relationships between Political Turnover and Effectiveness by AgencyConclusionChapter 5: Impact of Mission Stability, Regulatory Style, and Financial Resources on Regulatory EffectivenessMission Stability NCUA OTSFigure 5.1: Mentions in the Congressional Record by Agency, 1989 through 2008 OCCFigure 5.2: Number of Changes in Mission by Agency, 1989 through 2008Table 5.1: Mission Changes and Regulatory EffectivenessRegulatory Style Non-legal Interventions Legal InterventionsFigure 5.3: Annual Legal Intervention Percentage by Agency, 1998 through 2008Figure 5.4: Enforcement Rates as Percentages of Regulated Institutions by Agency, 1998 through 2008ResourcesFigure 5.5: Budgets by Agency, 1995 through 2008 (in $2011)Figure 5.6: OCC, OTS, and NCUA Budget per Institution Re...
