Fr. 95.00

Economics, Rational Choice and Normative Philosophy

English · Paperback / Softback

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Informationen zum Autor Thomas A. Boylan is a Personal Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at the National University of Ireland, Galway. Ruvin Gekker is a Lecturer of Economics in the Department of Economics at the National University of Ireland, Galway. Zusammenfassung Leading international experts in the field of normative social choice theory, complemented by experts in economic methodology and political science discuss the major developments arising from collaboration between experts in these cognate disciplines. Inhaltsverzeichnis I Diversity, rights, norms and intentions , 1. What is diversity? Nicholas Gravel , 2. Intentions, decisions and rationality Martin van Hees and Olivier Roy , 3. Waiving and exercising rights in the theory of social situations Ruvin Gekka , 4. Consequentialist choice and behaviour: a comparison Nicholas Baigent , II Social choice, judgment aggregation and rationality of legal order , 5. Social choice, fuzzy preferences and manipulations Juan Perote Pena and Ashley Piggins , 6. Judgment aggregation under constraints Franz Dietrich and Christian List , 7. Rationality and the legal order Gerald Pech , III Philosophical aspects of normative social choice , 8. Distributing causal responsibility in collectivities Matthew Braham and Manfred J. Holler , 9. The logic of valuing Boudewijn de Bruin , 10. Holistic defenses of rational choice theory: critique of Davidson and Pettit Thomas A. Boylan and Paschal F. O’Gorman

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