Fr. 40.50

Identity and Discrimination

English · Paperback / Softback

Shipping usually within 1 to 3 weeks (not available at short notice)


Read more

Informationen zum Autor Timothy Williamson is the Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford. He has previously taught at the University of Edinburgh, Trinity College Dublin, and as a visitor at MIT, Princeton, the Australian National University, the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is the author of Vagueness (1994), Knowledge and its Limits (2000), The Philosophy of Philosophy (Blackwell, 2007), and Modal Logic as Metaphysics (2013). He is a Fellow of the British Academy and a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Klappentext Identity and Discrimination, originally published in 1990 and the first book by respected philosopher Timothy Williamson, is now reissued and updated with the inclusion of significant new material. Williamson here proposes an original and rigorous theory linking identity, a relation central to metaphysics, and indiscriminability, a relation central to epistemology.* Updated and reissued edition of Williamson's first publication, with the inclusion of significant new material* Argues for an original cognitive account of the relation between identity and discrimination that has been influential in the philosophy of perception* Pioneers the use of epistemic logic to solve puzzles about indiscriminability* Develops the application of techniques from mathematical logic to understand issues about identity over time and across possible worlds Zusammenfassung Identity and Discrimination, originally published in 1990 and the first book by respected philosopher Timothy Williamson, is now reissued and updated with the inclusion of significant new material. Inhaltsverzeichnis Preface to the Revised Edition ixPreface to the First Edition xiiiIntroduction 11 Concepts of Indiscriminability 41.1 Indiscriminability and Cognition 51.2 Formal Features of Indiscriminability 101.3 The Intentionality of Indiscriminability 141.4 Direct and Indirect Discrimination 201.5 Further Reflections 212 Logics of Indiscriminability 242.1 Logical Apparatus 242.2 The Non-Transitivity of Indiscriminability 343 Paradoxes of Indiscriminability 434 Concepts of Phenomenal Character 484.1 Presentations of Characters 504.2 Presentation-Sensitivity 544.3 The Identity of Characters 625 Logics of Phenomenal Character 655.1 Maximal M-Relations 655.2 Ignorance and Indeterminacy 735.3 Matching the Same Experiences 826 Paradoxes of Phenomenal Character 886.1 The Paradox of Observational Predicates 896.2 The Paradox of Phenomenal Predicates 936.3 The Failure of Observationality 996.4 Sorites Arguments and Necessary Ignorance 1037 Generalizations 1097.1 Maximal M-Relations as Minimal Revisions 1097.2 Examples 1147.3 Necessary Conditions for Personal Identity 1167.4 Sufficient Conditions 1217.5 Close Relations 1238 Modal and Temporal Paradoxes 1268.1 A Modal Paradox 1268.2 Two Temporal Paradoxes 1358.3 Comparisons 1429 Criteria of Identity 1449.1 Forms 1449.2 Functions 148Appendix Maximal M-Relations and the Axiom of Choice 154Notes (to the First Edition) 158Additional Notes (to the Revised Edition) 165References (to the First Edition) 171Additional References (to the Revised Edition) 176Index 179...

Product details

Authors T Williamson, Timothy Williamson, Timothy (Oxford University Williamson
Publisher Wiley, John and Sons Ltd
Languages English
Product format Paperback / Softback
Released 08.03.2013
EAN 9781118432594
ISBN 978-1-118-43259-4
No. of pages 208
Subjects Humanities, art, music > Philosophy
Non-fiction book > Philosophy, religion > Philosophy: general, reference works

Erkenntnistheorie, Philosophie, Metaphysik, Philosophy, Epistemology, philosophische Logik, Metaphysics, Philosophical Logic

Customer reviews

No reviews have been written for this item yet. Write the first review and be helpful to other users when they decide on a purchase.

Write a review

Thumbs up or thumbs down? Write your own review.

For messages to please use the contact form.

The input fields marked * are obligatory

By submitting this form you agree to our data privacy statement.