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Zusatztext " Moral Perception contains a great deal that is of interest, and represents an important contribution to an ongoing debate." ---Stephen Ingram, Journal of Moral Philosophy Informationen zum Autor Robert Audi is John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. His books include Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character , Moral Value and Human Diversity , The Good in the Right (Princeton), and Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision . Klappentext We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions--distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. He describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics. Zusammenfassung We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions --distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. He describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics. Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. Audi explores the nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined statement to date of his widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics. He also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism. Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest, Moral Perception advances our understanding of central problems in ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions. Inhaltsverzeichnis Preface vii Acknowledgments xi Introduction 1 PART ONE Perception and Moral Knowledge 5 Chapter 1 Perception: Sensory! Conceptual! and Cognitive Dimensions 7 I. Major Kinds of Perception 8 II. The Phenomenology and Content of Perception 12 III. The Basis of Veridical Perception 21 Chapter 2 Moral Perception: Causal! Phenomenological! and Epistemological Elements 30 I. The Perception of Right and Wrong 30 II. The Representational Character of Moral Perception 38 Chapter 3 Perception as a Direct Source of Moral Knowledge 51 I. Perception and Inference 51 II. Can Moral Perception Be Naturalized? 55 III. Moral Perception as a Basis of Moral Knowledge 58 PART TWO Ethical Intuition! Emotional Sensibility! and Moral Judgment 67 Chapter 4 Perceptual Grounds! Ethical Disagreement! and Moral Intuitions 69 I. Does Moral Disagreement Undermine Justification in Ethics? 70 II. The Concept of an Intuition 83 III. Intuitions as Apprehensions 96 Chapter 5 Moral Perception! Aesthetic Perception! and Intuitive Judgment 103 I. The Role of Intuition in Aesthetic Experience 103 II. Aesthetic and Moral Properties: Comparison and Contrast 106 III. The Rule-Governed Element in Ethics and Aesthetics 109 IV. The Reliability of Intuition 112 Chapter 6 Emotion and Intuition as Sources of Moral Judgment 121 I. Emotion and Intuition: Interac...
