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What sense, if any, does it make to speak of God? This question, of such vital importance to religious commitment, occupies an important place in discussion among Anglo-American philosophers of religion whose orientation is logical analysis. Such discussion may be termed 'metatheological,' because of its focus on the meaning of religious language. 'Metatheological scepticism' is the view that denies the intelligibility of religious discourse. This view derives from a theory of meaning which holds that a sentence has cognitive significance only if it makes a statement that is conclusively verifiable on empirical grounds. Religious language is said to lack intelligibility because it fails to satisfy this verification requirement. Dr Heimbeck's argument for the cognitive nature of religious discourse is twofold. First, he shows that such discourse can qualify as cognitively significant without having to satisfy the verification requirement. Secondly, he shows that it does in fact satisfy such a requirement because it is firmly rooted in the empirical realm.
He shows that while religious language bears several similarities to non-cognitive discourse, its strongest affinities are with cognitive discourse. This study is for teachers and students of philosophy of religion. Originally published in 1969, the book is both easily comprehensible and highly readable, although the discussion of philosophical and theological points is conducted at an advanced level.
List of contents
Preface 1. Metatheology 2. Checkability 3. The Challengers (1) 4. The Challengers (2) 5. Falsifiability 6. Verifiability 7. Cognitive Meaning
Summary
What sense, if any, does it make to speak of God? This question, of such vital importance to religious commitment, occupies an important place in discussion among Anglo-American philosophers of religion whose orientation is logical analysis.
‘Metatheological scepticism’ is the view that denies the intelligibility of religious discourse, derived from a theory of meaning which holds that a sentence has cognitive significance only if it makes a statement that is conclusively verifiable on empirical grounds. Dr Heimbeck’s argument for the cognitive nature of religious discourse is twofold. First, he shows that such discourse can qualify as cognitively significant without having to satisfy the verification requirement. Secondly, he shows that it does in fact satisfy such a requirement because it is firmly rooted in the empirical realm.
Originally published in 1969, this book, for teachers and students of philosophy of religion, is both easily comprehensible and highly readable, although the discussion of philosophical and theological points is conducted at an advanced level.
