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Informationen zum Autor Eric Chelstrom served as Visiting Assistant Professor in philosophy at Grand Valley State University from 2009-2012, and currently continues to teach in there and in Grand Rapids area. He completed his doctoral studies in philosophy at the University at Buffalo, State University of New York under the direction of Kah Kyung Cho. He has presented at number of international conferences on issues ranging from the ontology of music to social ontology. Dr. Chelstrom's current research includes work on the role of horizon intentionality in Aristotelian friendships, to be published in a forthcoming volume titled Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics; research in the history of phenomenology, including work on the analyses of evil in phenomenology prior to Paul Ricoeur's Symbolism of Evil and on the influence of Adolf Reinach's social ontology on Edith Stein's philosophy; finally, his research is beginning to turn to the implications of a theory of collective intentionality for our understanding of the nature of art, paying specific attention to arguments from Arthur Danto's essay, "The Artworld". Klappentext Social Phenomenology offers an account of collective intentionality informed by the tradition of Husserlian phenomenology. The account argues that if consciousness and intentionality are only intrinsic to individuals, denying collectivism, that it does not follow that one endorses an atomistic conception of the subject. Zusammenfassung Social Phenomenology offers an account of collective intentionality informed by the tradition of Husserlian phenomenology. The account argues that if consciousness and intentionality are only intrinsic to individuals! denying collectivism! that it does not follow that one endorses an atomistic conception of the subject. Inhaltsverzeichnis Table of ContentsAcknowledgmentsIntroductionChapter 1: That Experience Does Not Motivate a Robust Claim for Collective ConsciousnessChapter 2: A Metaphysical Critique of the Notion of Collective ConsciousnessChapter 3: Plural Subjects: Phenomenology and Collective IntentionalityChapter 4: Responding to Criticisms: Phenomenological Evidence and Horizon IntentionalityChapter 5: The Phenomenology of the Social World and Gilbert's Plural Subject TheoryChapter 6: Responses to Two Criticisms Motivated by Realist ConcernsChapter 7: Responding to Sokolowski's Criticism of Husserlian IndividualismBibliographyAbout the Author...
