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This volume contains the proceedings of a conference at Freudenberg, Germany, that brought together some forty (environmental) economists from seven European countries and the U.S. in November 1990 to analy:se "Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources". I should like to thank the Volkswagen-Stiftung whose finan cial support made this conference possible. Additional funding by the Forschungsinstitut fur Geistes-und Sozialwissenschaften at the Universitiit - Gesamthochschule Siegen is also gratefully acknowledged. The papers and formal comments published in this volume emerged from those presented at Freudenberg. Thorough and competent discussions during and after the conference as well as an anonymous reviewing process led to major revisions which im proved the quality of all contributions. I am grateful to the authors for their construc tive collaboration before and during the conference as well as during the editing process. The authors demonstrated convincingly that they are not only able to scrutinise the inefficiencies of non-eooperation in their research work, but that they also succeeded to learn this lesson by avoiding delays of the editing process at the expense of the remain ing players.
List of contents
Editor's Introduction.- Editor's Introduction.- 1: International Dimensions.- 1 International Environmental Agreements as Games.- 2 Emission Taxes in a Dynamic International Game of CO2 Emissions.- 3 Critical Loads and International Environmental Cooperation.- 4 Environmental Conflicts and Strategic Commitment.- 5 The Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments and Strategic International Trade.- 6 Economic Models of Optimal Energy Use under Global Environmental Constraints.- 2: Monitoring and Enforcement.- 7 Monitoring and Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws in Europe and the United States.- 8 The Economics of Negotiations on Water Quality - An Application of Principal Agent Theory.- 9 Monitoring the Emission of Pollutants by Means of the Inspector Leadership Method.- 10 Illegal Pollution and Monitoring of Unknown Quality - A Signaling Game Approach -.
