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Zusatztext 'This major reassessment properly identifies! analyzes! and emphasizes the importance of political considerations and goals in determining U.S. strategy in the war against Japan. It provides a useful corrective to the popular but erroneous belief that U.S. strategy during World War II was based on 'purely military' factors.' - Mark A. Stoler! author of Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff! the Grand Alliance! and U.S. Strategy in World War II and George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century 'This is a lovely book: lean! elegant! crisp - by far the best narrative of American military diplomacy and strategy in the Pacific War. Its singular strengths include a careful analysis of the role of domestic - i.e.! 'public' - opinion on the Administration's and Joint Chiefs' judgments on naval and military strategies for the prosecution of the Pacific campaigns.' - Josiah Bunting! HF Guggenheim Foundatio Informationen zum Autor Charles F. Brower is Professor of History and International Affairs at Virginia Military Institute, USA, where he teaches courses in American foreign policy and strategy and holds the Henry King Burgwyn Chair in Military History. Klappentext This book argues that American strategists in the Joint Chiefs of Staff were keenly aware of the inseparability of political and military aspects of strategy in the fight against Japan in World War II. They understood that war not only has political sources, it also has political purposes that establish the war's objectives and help to define the nature of the peace to follow. They understood that policy was the 'guiding intelligence' for war, in Clausewitzian terms, and that to attempt to approach strategic problems was nonsensical. Zusammenfassung This book argues that American strategists in the Joint Chiefs of Staff were keenly aware of the inseparability of political and military aspects of strategy in the fight against Japan in World War II. They understood that war not only has political sources, it also has political purposes that establish the war's objectives and help to define the nature of the peace to follow. They understood that policy was the 'guiding intelligence' for war, in Clausewitzian terms, and that to attempt to approach strategic problems was nonsensical. Inhaltsverzeichnis Political Considerations and the War against Japan 'One Part of the Larger Whole': Pacific War Strategy to the Trident Conference 'A Most Critical Summer': From Trident to Quadrant, 1943 Strategic Reconciliation at Sextant Lengthening Political Shadows: Strategy in the Pacific, 1944 Assault versus Siege: The Debate over the Final Strategy for the Defeat of Japan...
List of contents
Political Considerations and the War against Japan 'One Part of the Larger Whole': Pacific War Strategy to the Trident Conference 'A Most Critical Summer': From Trident to Quadrant, 1943 Strategic Reconciliation at Sextant Lengthening Political Shadows: Strategy in the Pacific, 1944 Assault versus Siege: The Debate over the Final Strategy for the Defeat of Japan
Report
'This major reassessment properly identifies, analyzes, and emphasizes the importance of political considerations and goals in determining U.S. strategy in the war against Japan. It provides a useful corrective to the popular but erroneous belief that U.S. strategy during World War II was based on 'purely military' factors.' - Mark A. Stoler, author of Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II and George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century
'This is a lovely book: lean, elegant, crisp - by far the best narrative of American military diplomacy and strategy in the Pacific War. Its singular strengths include a careful analysis of the role of domestic - i.e., 'public' - opinion on the Administration's and Joint Chiefs' judgments on naval and military strategies for the prosecution of the Pacific campaigns.' - Josiah Bunting, HF Guggenheim Foundatio
