Read more
Zusatztext "Alan Tarr addresses one of the most dramatic contrasts between the national and (most) state governments in the United States: the strong reliance on elected judiciaries in the states. The topic is not only of genuine theoretical interest—e.g., are elected judiciaries measurably worse than appointed judiciaries of the kind we have at the national level?—but also of increasing public interest as well, given the increased willingness of angry electorates to fire judges whose opinions they do not like. Tarr has written a highly readable book that provides a plausible solution to the particular ills of elected judiciaries that does not require eliminating them." Informationen zum Autor G. Alan Tarr is Director of the Center for State Constitutional Studies and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University-Camden. He is the author or editor of several books on constitutionalism and on federalism, and has lectured on these subjects in United States, Africa, Asia, Europe, and South America. Klappentext G. Alan Tarr is Director of the Center for State Constitutional Studies and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University-Camden. He is the author or editor of several books on constitutionalism and on federalism, and has lectured on these subjects in United States, Africa, Asia, Europe, and South America. Zusammenfassung This volume examines how the American states have sought to ensure judicial independence and judicial accountability, both over time and in the current era of politicized judicial selection, and proposes mechanisms for doing so.
