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These experts in the field challenge commonly held views about the success of the global war on terrorism and its campaign in Afghanistan. Their book questions some fundamentals of the population-centric COIN doctrine currently in vogue and harshly criticizes key decisions about the prosecution of the Afghan war. It is the only book to compare the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan from a national strategic perspective. It questions several key operational factors in Afghanistan, including the decision to give NATO the lead, the performance of both civilian and military leaders, and the prosecution of an Iraq War-style surge. It also contrasts the counterinsurgency campaign styles and the leadership of senior American officials in both Iraq and Afghanistan. A final chapter outlines key lessons of the two campaigns.
About the author
John R. Ballard, Ph.D. is Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs at the National War College. David W. Lamm is the Deputy Director of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. John K. Wood is an Associate Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.
Summary
Provides insight into the key strategic decisions of the Afghan and Iraq campaigns as the United States attempted to wage war simultaneously against al-Qaeda and its supporting affiliates. It also evaluates the strategic execution of those military campaigns to identify how well the two operations were conducted in light of their political objectives.
