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Zusatztext A well-crafted and important work, a work that will without doubt influence the discussion of Buddhist epistemology, and the analysis of the relation between Buddhist thought and phenomenology for years to come. Informationen zum Autor Assistant Professor of Philosophy, College of Charleston Klappentext This book examines the epistemic function of perception and the relation between language and conceptual thought, and provides new ways of conceptualizing the Buddhist defense of the reflexivity thesis of consciousness: namely, that each cognitive event is to be understood as involving a pre-reflective implicit awareness of its own occurrence. Zusammenfassung This book examines the epistemic function of perception and the relation between language and conceptual thought, and provides new ways of conceptualizing the Buddhist defense of the reflexivity thesis of consciousness: namely, that each cognitive event is to be understood as involving a pre-reflective implicit awareness of its own occurrence. Inhaltsverzeichnis Abbreviations Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: Methodological and Metatheoretical Considerations 1. Doctrine and Argument 2. Reason and Discourse Analysis 3. Cognition as Enactive Transformation 4. Phenomenological Epistemology and the Project of Naturalism Chapter 3: Sensation and the Empirical Consciousness 1. No-self and the Domains of Experience 2. Two Dimensions of Mind: Consciousness as Discernment and Sentience 3. Attention and Mental Proliferation 4. Cognitive Awareness and Its Object Chapter 4: Perception, Conception, and Language 1. Shared Notions about Perceptual Knowledge 2. Debating the Criteria for Reliable Cognition 3. Cognitive Aspects and Linguistic Conventions 4. Epistemology as Cognitive Event Theory Chapter 5: An Encyclopaedic and Compassionate Setting for Buddhist Epistemology 1. The Definition of Purpose: Dependent Arising and Compassion 2. Mapping the Ontological and Epistemological Domains 3. Perception and the Principle of Clarity Chapter 6: Perception as an Epistemic Modality 1. "Conception Free" as a condition of "Perceptual Knowledge" 2. Perception, Conception, and the Problem of Naming 3. Cognitive Errors and Perceptual Illusions Chapter 7: Foundationalism and the Phenomenology of Perception 1. Intrinsic Ascertainment and the "Given" 2. Particulars and Phenomenal Objects 3. Foundationalism and Its Malcontents 4. Naturalism and Its Discontents 5. Beyond Representation: An Enactive Perception Theory Chapter 8: Perception, Self-Awareness, and Intentionality 1. Reflexivity and the Aspectual Nature of Intentional Reference 2. Knowledge, Phenomenal Objects, and the Cognitive Subconscious 3. Phenomenology and the Intentionality of Perception Chapter 9: In Defense of Epistemological Optimism 1. A Moving Horizon 2. Embodied Consciousness: Beyond "Seeing" and "Seeing As" 3. Epistemic Authority Without Manifest Truth Bibliography ...
