Fr. 138.00

Scepticism, Freedom and Autonomy - A Study of the Moral Foundations of Descartes' Theory of Knowledge

English · Hardback

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How much does what we think depend on what we want? Descartes' much-discussed position has often been interpreted to mean that we hold an opinion as the result of a decision. In Scepticism, Freedom and Autonomy, Araujo argues against this interpretation, asserting that we retain control over our opinions only through selective attention. Even for this limited control, however, Cartesian Scepticism implies the possibility of self-delusion, symbolized in the writings of Descartes by the figure of the evil god. Hence, the existence of an evil god would not only cast doubt on our claims to knowledge but also jeopardize our freedom.
In this new interpretation, the Cartesian Scepticism, which is usually ascribed only epistemic significance, proves relevant for a fundamental moral question, that of human autonomy in general.

About the author










Marcelo de Araujo is a university lecturer on philosophy at the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro.

Product details

Authors Marcelo de Araujo
Publisher De Gruyter
 
Languages English
Product format Hardback
Released 01.01.2002
 
EAN 9783110175387
ISBN 978-3-11-017538-7
No. of pages 208
Dimensions 155 mm x 21 mm x 230 mm
Weight 474 g
Illustrations 2 b/w ill., 8 b/w tbl.
Series Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie
Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie
ISSN
Subjects Humanities, art, music > Philosophy
Non-fiction book > Philosophy, religion > Philosophy: antiquity to present day

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