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We think we have scientific knowledge when we know the cause. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics Book II, Part 11) About 12 years ago, when I was a graduate student, many people were concerned about my Ph. D. topic - investigating the effect of the complexity of procedu- lized tasks on the performance of human operators working in nuclear power plants. Although they agreed with the fact that procedures (especially emergency operating procedures) play a crucial role in securing the safety of nuclear power plants, it was amazing that most of them pointed out a very similar issue: "I cannot understand why operating personnel see any difficulty (or complexity) in condu- ing procedures, because all that they have to do is to follow a simple IF-THEN- ELSE rule as written. " Actually, this issue is closely related to one of the main questions I was recently asked, such as "Don't you think your work is too acad- ic to apply to actual procedures?" or "I guess we don't need to consider the c- plexity of procedures, because we can develop a good procedure using many pr- tical procedure writers' guidelines. Then what is the real contribution of your work?" I absolutely agree with the latter comment. Yes, we can develop a good pro- dure with the support of many practical and excellent guidelines.
List of contents
Foundation.- Complexity of Proceduralized Tasks.- Significant Complexity Factors.- Complexity Evaluation.- to Software Complexity.- Emergency Tasks Prescribed in the EOPs of NPPs.- Analyzing the Required Actions Prescribed in Emergency Tasks.- Quantifying the Contribution of Task Complexity Factors.- Integrating the Contribution of Each Complexity Factor.- Validation of TACOM Measure.- Promising Applications and Outlook.- Promising Applications.- Concluding Remarks with Outlook.
About the author
Jinkyun Park obtained his first degree in nuclear engineering in 1991 at Hanyang University in Seoul, Republic of Korea. He later earned his PhD degree in nuclear engineering at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology in Daejeon, Republic of Korea. He joined the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute in 2000, and now works as a senior researcher in the institute's Integrated Safety Assessment Division. His main research interest is in the performance of nuclear power plant operators who have to cope with an emergency by following a procedure. Dr Park uses the theories of human reliability analysis and cognitive systems engineering to suggest a practical way to improve the performance of human operators under emergencies.
Summary
We think we have scientific knowledge when we know the cause. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics Book II, Part 11) About 12 years ago, when I was a graduate student, many people were concerned about my Ph. D. topic – investigating the effect of the complexity of procedu- lized tasks on the performance of human operators working in nuclear power plants. Although they agreed with the fact that procedures (especially emergency operating procedures) play a crucial role in securing the safety of nuclear power plants, it was amazing that most of them pointed out a very similar issue: “I cannot understand why operating personnel see any difficulty (or complexity) in condu- ing procedures, because all that they have to do is to follow a simple IF-THEN- ELSE rule as written. ” Actually, this issue is closely related to one of the main questions I was recently asked, such as “Don’t you think your work is too acad- ic to apply to actual procedures?” or “I guess we don’t need to consider the c- plexity of procedures, because we can develop a good procedure using many pr- tical procedure writers’ guidelines. Then what is the real contribution of your work?” I absolutely agree with the latter comment. Yes, we can develop a good pro- dure with the support of many practical and excellent guidelines.
