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How is linguistic theory related to linguistic practice? What do theoretical notions and models tell us about real-life language use? Are there any limits to what such notions and models can reasonably be taken to accomplish? These questions are fundamental to any serious investigation into the phenomena of human communication. The essays in this book show that philosophers and linguists of quite different brands have tended to give undue priority to their own favourite theoretical framework, and have presupposed that the descriptive scheme invoked by that framework constitutes a pattern to which any linguistic practice somehow has to conform. What unites the contributors to this volume is a critical attitude towards such essentialist aspirations. By investigating several concrete examples of this tendency - examples collected from such seemingly disparate areas as structuralism, contemporary analytic philosophy and feminist epistemology - the authors collectively manage to cast doubt on the very attempt to fit the whole of linguistic practice into a general theoretical mould.
List of contents
I. Historical Perspectives.- On the Linguistic Turn in Philosophy.- Humboldt: Grammatical Form and "Weltansicht".- Language as Sign and Use: A Study of Certain Aspects of Saussure's View of Language.- II. Prejudiced Preconceptions: Notions of Language Within Linguistics and Feminist Epistemology.- Expression and Content in Linguistic Theory.- The History of Swedish Grammar and Professor Chomsky.- How Ordinary is Ordinary Experience? Language in Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science.- III. The Practice of Meaning and Truth.- Putnam on Truth.- Meaning, Saying, Truth.- IV. Themes from Wittgenstein.- Wittgenstein, Meursault and the Difficulty of Philosophy.- Wittgenstein, Logical Form and Grammatical Remarks.- On Rule-Following.- Are We all Trapped in Nonsense?.- On the Need for a Listener and Community Standards.- References.- Notes on the Contributors.
Summary
How is linguistic theory related to linguistic practice? What do theoretical notions and models tell us about real-life language use? Are there any limits to what such notions and models can reasonably be taken to accomplish? These questions are fundamental to any serious investigation into the phenomena of human communication. The essays in this book show that philosophers and linguists of quite different brands have tended to give undue priority to their own favourite theoretical framework, and have presupposed that the descriptive scheme invoked by that framework constitutes a pattern to which any linguistic practice somehow has to conform. What unites the contributors to this volume is a critical attitude towards such essentialist aspirations. By investigating several concrete examples of this tendency - examples collected from such seemingly disparate areas as structuralism, contemporary analytic philosophy and feminist epistemology - the authors collectively manage to cast doubt on the very attempt to fit the whole of linguistic practice into a general theoretical mould.
