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Preferences and Procedures presents and tests game-theoretic models of European Union legislative decision-making. It is inspired by the idea of linking statistical testing strategies firmly to formal models of EU policymaking. After describing salient features of the EU legislative process and comparing different models of how the EU negotiates new legislative measures, the models' predictive power is evaluated. On a more general level, Preferences and Procedures answers questions regarding the empirically recognizable effects of institutional arrangements on joint bargaining outcomes.
List of contents
Conceptualizing the European Union Legislative Process: Some Insight from the Federalist Papers.- Assessing the Current State of the Spatial Models Literature.- Spatial Models of Politcs: An Introduction and a Comparison Using Computer Simulation.- A Data Set and an Analysis of France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom in EU Legislative Negotiations.- Between Power and Luck: The European Parliament in the EU Legislative Process.- Evaluating the Predictive Power of a Spatial Model for the European Union Legislative Process.- Summary and Conclusions.
About the author
Torsten J. Selck is working as Assistant Professor of Political Economy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands.
Summary
Preferences and Procedures presents and tests game-theoretic models of European Union legislative decision-making. It is inspired by the idea of linking statistical testing strategies firmly to formal models of EU policymaking. After describing salient features of the EU legislative process and comparing different models of how the EU negotiates new legislative measures, the models' predictive power is evaluated. On a more general level, Preferences and Procedures answers questions regarding the empirically recognizable effects of institutional arrangements on joint bargaining outcomes.
