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Informationen zum Autor Kit Fine is Silver Professor of Philosophy and Mathematics at New York University, and specializes in metaphysics, logic, and philosophy of language. He has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation and the American Council of Learned Societies and is a former editor of the Journal of Symbolic Logic . He is the author of Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects (Blackwell, 1985), The Limits of Abstraction (2002) and Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers (2005) and the co-author of Worlds, Times and Selves (1977). He has also written papers in ancient philosophy, linguistics, computer science, and economic theory, in addition to the papers in his central fields of interest. Klappentext Kit Fine argues for a fundamentally new approach to the study of representation in language and thought. His key idea is that there may be representational relationships between expressions or elements of thought that are not grounded in the intrinsic representational features of the expressions or elements themselves. This idea is shown to lead to solutions to many of the standard puzzles in the area - Frege's identity puzzle, Kripke's puzzle about belief, and Moore's paradox of analysis. It is also shown to lead to a more defensible form of direct reference theory - one that is immune to many of the objections that the Fregeans have leveled against it. Based upon the first Brown/Blackwell lecture series and the John Locke lectures, this ground-breaking work is essential reading for anyone interested in the general nature of representation. Zusammenfassung Kit Fine argues for a fundamentally new approach to the study of representation in language and thought. His key idea is that there may be representational relationships between expressions or elements of thought that are not grounded in the intrinsic representational features of the expressions or elements themselves. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction 1. Coordination among Variables A. The Desiderata B. The Problem C. The Contextualist Response D. The Dismissive Response E. The Instantial Approach F. The Algebraic Approach G. Relational Semantics for First-order Logic 2. Coordination within Language A. Frege's Puzzle B. Rejecting Compositionality C. Semantic Fact D. Closure E. Referentialism Reconsidered F. A Relational Semantics for Names G. Transparency 3. Coordination within Thought A. Intentional Coordination B. Strict Co-representation C. The Content of Thought D. The Cognitive Puzzle 4. Coordination between Speakers A. Kripke's Puzzle B. Some Related Puzzles C. A Response D. A Solution E. A Deeper Puzzle F. A Deeper Solution G. The Role of Variables in Belief Reports H. Some Semantical Morals Postscript: Further Work Index ...
