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Informationen zum Autor FABRIZIO BALASSONE Bank of Italy, ItalyOLAV BJERKHOLT University of Oslo, NorwayMIGUEL BRAUN University of San Andres, ColombiaMARCO BUTI European Commission, InternationalANDRÉS CONESA Secretariat of Finance, MexicoFABRIZIO CORICELLI University of Siena, ItalyALLAN DRAZEN Tel Aviv University, IsraelVALERIO ERCOLANI University of Siena, ItalyDANIELE FRANCO Bank of Italy, ItalyGABRIELE GIUDICE European Commission, ItalyILAN GOLDFAJN Central Bank of Brazil, BrazilCHRISTIAN Y. GONZALEZ Georgetown University, USAEDUARDO R. GUARDIA State of Sao Paulo, BrazilRICARDO HAUSMANN Harvard University, USAKALPANA KOCHHAR International Monetary Fund, USAIRENE NICULESCU Central University of Venezuela and Ministry of Finance, VenezuelaGUILLERMO PERRY The World Bank, USACATRIONA PURFIELD International Monetary Fund, USADAVID ROSENBLATT The World Bank, USAALLEN SCHICK Brookings Institution and University of Maryland, USAMOISÉS J. SCHWARTZ Secretariat of Finance, MexicoALEJANDRO SOMUANO Secretariat of Finance, MexicoJ. ALFREDO TIJERINA Secretariat of Finance, MexicoMARIANO TOMMASI University of San Andres, ColombiaSTEVEN B. WEBB The World Bank, USASTEFANIA ZOTTERI Bank of Italy, Italy Klappentext Inspired by the experience of some advanced economies, a number of emerging market economies have recently adopted rules limiting the budget deficit, expenditure level, or indebtedness of the public sector, while others consider them for eventual adoption. This volume brings together policy analysts to discuss the rationale, suitability, and usefulness of fiscal policy rules in emerging market economies. Grouped under three main parts (political economy and macroeconomic setting; design issues at the national level; design issues at the subnational level), the chapters have a practical orientation, based on conceptual grounding. Zusammenfassung Inspired by the experience of some advanced economies, a number of emerging market economies have recently adopted rules limiting the budget deficit, expenditure level, or indebtedness of the public sector, while others consider them for eventual adoption. This volume brings together policy analysts to discuss the rationale, suitability, and usefulness of fiscal policy rules in emerging market economies. Grouped under three main parts (political economy and macroeconomic setting; design issues at the national level; design issues at the subnational level), the chapters have a practical orientation, based on conceptual grounding. Inhaltsverzeichnis Overview of Fiscal Policy Rules in Emerging Markets; G.Kopits PART I: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND MACROECONOMIC SETTING Fiscal Rules from a Political Economy Perspective; A.Drazen Good Debt Ratios, Bad Credit Ratings: The Role of Debt Structure; R.Hausmann Can Fiscal Rules Help Reduce Macroeconomic Volatility?; G.Perry Fiscal Policy and High Capital Mobility; G.Kopits Fiscal Institutions Versus Political Will; A.Schick PART II: DESIGN ISSUES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL EMU Fiscal Rules: What Can and Cannot Be Exported; M.Buti & G.Giudice Fiscal Rules and Debt Sustainability in Brazil; I.Goldfajn & E.R.Guardia Fiscal Rules in Mexico: Evolution and Prospects; A.Conesa , M.J.Schwartz , A.Somuano & J.A.Tijerina Fiscal Rules on the Road to an Enlarged European Union; F.Coricelli & V.Ercolani Fiscal Rules for Economies with Nonrenewable Resources: Norway and Venezuela; O.Bjerkholt & I.Niculescu PART III: DESIGN ISSUES AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL Subnational Fiscal Rules: A Game Theoretic Approach; M.Braun & M.Tommasi Rules-Based Adjustment in a Highly Decentralized Context: The Case of India; K.Kochhar & C.Purfield Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments: Lessons from the EMU; F.Balassone, D.Franco & S.Zotteri Rules for Stabilizing Intergovernmental Transfers in Latin America; C.Y.Gonzalez, D.Rosenblat t & S.B.Webb...
List of contents
Overview of Fiscal Policy Rules in Emerging Markets; G.Kopits PART I: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND MACROECONOMIC SETTING Fiscal Rules from a Political Economy Perspective; A.Drazen Good Debt Ratios, Bad Credit Ratings: The Role of Debt Structure; R.Hausmann Can Fiscal Rules Help Reduce Macroeconomic Volatility?; G.Perry Fiscal Policy and High Capital Mobility; G.Kopits Fiscal Institutions Versus Political Will; A.Schick PART II: DESIGN ISSUES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL EMU Fiscal Rules: What Can and Cannot Be Exported; M.Buti & G.Giudice Fiscal Rules and Debt Sustainability in Brazil; I.Goldfajn & E.R.Guardia Fiscal Rules in Mexico: Evolution and Prospects; A.Conesa , M.J.Schwartz , A.Somuano & J.A.Tijerina Fiscal Rules on the Road to an Enlarged European Union; F.Coricelli & V.Ercolani Fiscal Rules for Economies with Nonrenewable Resources: Norway and Venezuela; O.Bjerkholt & I.Niculescu PART III: DESIGN ISSUES AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL Subnational Fiscal Rules: A Game Theoretic Approach; M.Braun & M.Tommasi Rules-Based Adjustment in a Highly Decentralized Context: The Case of India; K.Kochhar & C.Purfield Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments: Lessons from the EMU; F.Balassone, D.Franco & S.Zotteri Rules for Stabilizing Intergovernmental Transfers in Latin America; C.Y.Gonzalez, D.Rosenblat t & S.B.Webb
