Fr. 70.00

Equity Financing and Covenants in Venture Capital - An Augmented Contracting Approach to Optimal German Contract Design. Dissertation European Business School Oestrich-Winkel 2005. Vorw. v. Ulrich Hommel

Englisch · Taschenbuch

Versand in der Regel in 6 bis 7 Wochen

Beschreibung

Mehr lesen

Venture capital contracts define the rules of the investment for the venture capitalist and the portfolio company. They therefore have the potential to impact the success of the business and the venture capitalist's return. For this reason, contracts have recently attracted great research interest.

Karoline Jung-Senssfelder presents the first augmented contracting analysis, focusing on the interaction of both, financial instruments and covenants, in the creation of incentives to the contracting parties. With a focus on the German market, she integrates the findings of her model-based theoretical and survey-based empirical analyses to derive value-adding implications for an incentive-compatible contract design in the German venture capital market.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Venture capital and contracting
Review of academic literature
Contract design approach to cash flow incentive mechanisms
Empirical evidence on contractual architecture

Über den Autor / die Autorin

Dr. Karoline Jung-Senssfelder promovierte am Stiftungslehrstuhl Unternehmensfinanzierung und Kapitalmärkte der European Business School, Oestrich-Winkel.


Zusammenfassung

Venture capital contracts define the rules of the investment for the venture capitalist and the portfolio company. They therefore have the potential to impact the success of the business and the venture capitalist's return. For this reason, contracts have recently attracted great research interest.


Karoline Jung-Senssfelder presents the first augmented contracting analysis, focusing on the interaction of both, financial instruments and covenants, in the creation of incentives to the contracting parties. With a focus on the German market, she integrates the findings of her model-based theoretical and survey-based empirical analyses to derive value-adding implications for an incentive-compatible contract design in the German venture capital market.

Kundenrezensionen

Zu diesem Artikel wurden noch keine Rezensionen verfasst. Schreibe die erste Bewertung und sei anderen Benutzern bei der Kaufentscheidung behilflich.

Schreibe eine Rezension

Top oder Flop? Schreibe deine eigene Rezension.

Für Mitteilungen an CeDe.ch kannst du das Kontaktformular benutzen.

Die mit * markierten Eingabefelder müssen zwingend ausgefüllt werden.

Mit dem Absenden dieses Formulars erklärst du dich mit unseren Datenschutzbestimmungen einverstanden.