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Zusammenfassung Explores how nuclear deterrence should be understood seventy years after the first nuclear tests. These essays! edited by George P. Shultz and James E. Goodby! challenge outdated deterrence theories and show a clear need to re-examine notions from the Cold War that no longer fit present circumstances. They argue that a world without nuclear weapons is a desirable objective. Klappentext Explores how nuclear deterrence should be understood seventy years after the first nuclear tests. These essays! edited by George P. Shultz and James E. Goodby! challenge outdated deterrence theories and show a clear need to re-examine notions from the Cold War that no longer fit present circumstances. They argue that a world without nuclear weapons is a desirable objective.
Info autore
George P. Shultz has had a distinguished career in government, in academia, and in the world of business. He is one of two individuals who have held four different federal cabinet posts, has taught at three of the country's great universities, and for eight years he was president of a major engineering and construction company. He is a coauthor of Implications of the Reykjavik Summit on Its Twentieth Anniversary and Nuclear Security and coeditor of Deterrence, Ending Government Bailouts as We Know Them, Game Changers, The Nuclear Enterprise, and Reykjavik Revisited. He lives in San Francisco. James E. Goodby has served in the U.S. Foreign Service, achieving the rank of Career Minister, and was appointed to five ambassadorial-rank positions and taught at Georgetown, Syracuse, and Carnegie Mellon Universities and is Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus at Carnegie Mellon. He is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a senior fellow with the Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. He lives in Washington, DC.
