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The Long Arc of Legality breaks the current deadlock in philosophy of law between legal positivism and natural law by showing that any understanding of law as a matter of authority must account for the interaction of enacted law with fundamental principles of legality. This interaction conditions law's content so that officials have the moral resources to answer the legal subject's question, 'But, how can that be law for me?' David Dyzenhaus brings Thomas Hobbes and Hans Kelsen into a dialogue with H. L. A. Hart, showing that philosophy of law must work with the idea of legitimate authority and its basis in the social contract. He argues that the legality of international law and constitutional law are integral to the main tasks of philosophy of law, and that legal theory must attend both to the politics of legal space and to the way in which law provides us with a 'public conscience'.
Info autore
David Dyzenhaus is University Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Toronto, Canada. He works on legality under stress, an interest that he developed as a law student in apartheid South Africa. As one of the leading theorists of the rule of law, his work both reshapes philosophy of law and connects its most abstract concerns to the practical dilemmas human rights lawyers face.
Riassunto
This book fundamentally reshapes philosophy of law by making central to its inquiry legality and the rule of law, constitutional theory, political theory, international law, the social contract, and legitimacy. It also shows the way in which the legal theories of Thomas Hobbes and Hans Kelsen enrich current debates.
Testo aggiuntivo
‘How the social fact of power is transformed into the normative relationship of authority is a genuine and deep puzzle in the philosophy of law. Dyzenhaus traces how legal positivists, starting with Hobbes, have attended to the way in which the law maintains a relationship of mutual respect and accountability between ruler and subject. His provocative claim is that ‘long arc of legality’ from Hobbes through Kelsen to Hart reveals the ways in which legal positivists have subtly incorporated insights from their major critics – the natural lawyers – to answer the question of how law can have legitimate authority for its subjects. Through careful analysis of their contributions, he develops a distinctive account of the authority of law, capable of answering the question, ‘But, how can that be law for me?’’ W. Bradley Wendel, Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School
