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Zusatztext Divided Sovereignty makes a compelling case for supplementing sovereign states with coercive international institutions. Though it shares a concern for global justice, the book presents a powerful alternative to the institutional visions typically outlined by cosmopolitans. By prioritizing good institutional design over abstract morality, and defending the importance of collective self-determination, Pavel reorients recent debates. This is an original and important book. Informationen zum Autor Associate Director & Research Professor, University of Arizona Center for Philosophy and Freedom Klappentext This book explores new institutional solutions to the old question of how to constrain states when they commit severe abuses against their own citizens. The book argues that coercive international institutions can stop these abuses and act as an insurance scheme against the possibility of states failing to fulfill their most basic sovereign responsibilities. Zusammenfassung This book explores new institutional solutions to the old question of how to constrain states when they commit severe abuses against their own citizens. The book argues that coercive international institutions can stop these abuses and act as an insurance scheme against the possibility of states failing to fulfill their most basic sovereign responsibilities. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction 1. Why Divided Sovereignty? 2. Method and Justification 3. Outline of the Book Chapter 1 Sovereignty, the Social Contract, and the Incompleteness of the State System 1. The Institutions of the Social Contract 2. On Sovereignty and Delegation of Authority 3. Problems of Institutional Design 4. Conceptual and practical Hurdles to Divided Sovereignty 5. Conclusion Chapter 2 Divided Sovereignty: the Principal-Agent Model 1. Sovereignty Limiting Norms and their Current Effects 2. Divided Sovereignty: The Principal-Agent Model 2.1 The Origins of the Model 2.2 The Principle-Agent Model for International Institutions 2.3 Delegation 2.4 The Role of Consent 3. Agency Costs at the International Level 4. Why Use Principal-Agent Theory? 5. Conclusion Chapter 3 Domestic and International Implications: Slavery, Genocide and Civil War 1. The Scope and Limits of International Authority 2. Constitutional Interpretation and Change 3. Slavery 4. Genocide 5. Civil Wars and Failed States 6. Conclusion Chapter 4 Theories and Institutional Facts 1. One Step Theorizing: Cosmopolitan Justice 2. Two Step Theorizing: The Case of Humanitarian Intervention 3. Objections 4. Conclusion Chapter 5 Romanticizing Institutions 1. Cosmopolitan Global Democracy 2. Rule of Law Experiments 3. Rule of Law for Global Democracy 4. Institutional Assumptions and Bureaucratic Pathologies 5. Conclusion Chapter 6 Institutional Pluralism 1. Institutions in International Criminal Law 2. Fragmentation and Conflict 3. The Benefits of a Pluralist System 4. Complex Social Orders 5. A Hobbesian Challenge 6. Conclusion Chapter 7 The Possibility of Rule-Governed Behavior in International Politics 1. Cooperation under Anarchy 2. Assumptions and Implications of International Relations Theorizing 3. Self-Preservation as the Dominant State Preference 4. The Possibility of a Rule-Governed Order Conclusion ...
