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Informationen zum Autor Kenneth Arrow is the Joan Kenney Professor of Economics and Professor of Operations Research, emeritus; a CHP/PCOR fellow; and an FSI senior fellow by courtesy. He is the joint winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with John Hicks in 1972. To date, he is the youngest person to have received this award, at 51. In economics, he is a figure in post-World War II neo-classical economic theory. Many of his former graduate students have gone on to win the Nobel Memorial Prize themselves. His most significant works are his contributions to social choice theory, notably "Arrow's impossibility theorem", and his work on general equilibrium analysis. He has also provided foundational work in many other areas of economics, including endogenous growth theory and the economics of information. He has been co-editor of the Handbooks in Economics series since the mid-1980s. Klappentext The literature of social choice investigates individual and societal preferences as well as a collective rationality by drawing on a combination of economic theory! philosophical perspectives! and historical records. This volume! edited by the leaders of social choice theory! presents broad yet detailed examinations of its antecedents! its growth and increasing sophistication! and its potential paths of future development. Its contributors record the controversies! the breakthrough concepts! the inherent tension between public welfare and individual rights! and the limitations of their tools. A volume without peers! this collection of original essays captures the infinite variety of responses to this challenging economic domain. Zusammenfassung Describes economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. This book is suitable for those who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making.
List of contents
Preface to Volume 2
Part 5: Foundations.
13. Functions of social choice theory (K. Arrow)
14. Informational basis of social choice theory (A. Sen).
15. Competitive market mechanism as a social choice procedure (P. Hammond)
16. Functionings and Capabilities (K. Basu, L.F. Lopez-Calva)
Part 6: Developments of the basic arrovian schemes.
17. Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains (M. LeBreton, J. Weymark)
18. Topological theories of social choice (N. Baigent)
19. Non-binary social choice theory (R. Deb)
Part 7: Non-welfaristic issues in social choice
20. Social choice with fuzzy preferences (M. Salles, C.R. Barrett)
21. Fair Allocation Rules (W. Thompson)
22. Compensation and responsibility (M. Fleurbaey, F. Maniquet)
23. Welfarism, Individual Rights, and Procedural Fairness (K. Suzumura)
24. Freedom, opportunity and well-being (J. Foster)
Part 8: Voting, manipulation and fairness
25. Strategy proofness (S. Barbera)
26. Probabilistic and spatial models of voting (P. Coughlin).
27. Geometry of voting (D. Saari).
Report
"This volume continues the strong tradition of volume I (2002), supplementing it with foundational material and new results on Arrovian social choice. It also includes new material on fairness, rights, and manipulation, making the two volumes a masterful presentation of all the important topics in the field by its leading experts, including three Nobel laureates." --Steven Brams, New York University
"This much awaited volume provides authoritative surveys of some of the most important aspects of the theory of social choice and welfare economics. It will be a highly valuable resource for scholars interested in this area." --Prasanta K. Pattanaik, University of California, Riverside
"Social choice theory has produced some of the most powerful (and beautiful) findings in theoretical social science. This long-awaited volume will be a valuable resource to both students and scholars interested in exploring this important field." --Eric Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics
