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The constantly growing number of arising referee corruption cases as well as their damage to the integrity of the sports society raises the question of why sports associations started availing themselves of referees as an instrument of contest design in the first place? Cedric Duvinage shows that economic theory allows to develop a deeper understanding of the role of a referee in a contest as well as of the danger of sports corruption by considering a referee s influence on the competitors strategies in a contest. These insights provide the basis for efficient anti-corruption policies as well as their urgent implementation resulting from the current legal ambiguity regarding the prosecution of sports corruption in Germany.
About the author
Dr. Cedric Duvinage received his doctor’s degree from the WHU Otto-Beisheim School of Management in business administration at the chair of Prof. Dr. Peter-J. Jost. He has now specialized in building startup companies with the goal to combine the old and the new economy.
Summary
The constantly growing number of arising referee corruption cases as well as their damage to the integrity of the sports society raises the question of why sports associations started availing themselves of referees as an instrument of contest design in the first place? Cedric Duvinage shows that economic theory allows to develop a deeper understanding of the role of a referee in a contest as well as of the danger of sports corruption by considering a referee’s influence on the competitors’ strategies in a contest. These insights provide the basis for efficient anti-corruption policies as well as their urgent implementation resulting from the current legal ambiguity regarding the prosecution of sports corruption in Germany.
