Fixing Reference

Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. She explains how relations to objects including perceptual attention, understanding of proper names, and grasp of descriptions do their aboutness-fixing and thought-enabling work.

Sommario

• 1: Introduction


• 2: In which a precise version of the connection between aboutness and justification is derived from more basic principles


• 3: The mind has a basic need to represent things outside itself


• 4: Perceptual demonstratives


• 5: Proper names


• 6: The delicate question of reference by description


• 7: Descriptions and singular thought


• 8: Thought and consciousness


• Appendix: Key to notation


• References


• Index

Info autore

Imogen Dickie did her first degree in New Zealand and her graduate work at Oxford. She is currently a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto.

Riassunto

Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. She explains how relations to objects including perceptual attention, understanding of proper names, and grasp of descriptions do their aboutness-fixing and thought-enabling work.

Dettagli sul prodotto

• Autori: Imogen Dickie, Imogen (University of Toronto) Dickie, Dickie Imogen
• Editore: Oxford University Press
• Lingue: Inglese
• Formato: Tascabile
• Pubblicazione: 22.02.2018
• EAN: 9780198801795
• ISBN: 978-0-19-880179-5
• Pagine: 344
• Serie: Context & Content
• Categorie: Scienze umane, arte, musica > Scienze linguistiche e letterarie > Linguistica generale e comparata; Philosophy of Language, PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body, PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology, PHILOSOPHY / Language, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge, Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge