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This volume presents new research on the epistemology of seemings. It features original essays by leading epistemologists on the nature and epistemic import of seemings and intuitions.
List of contents
Introductory Note
Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford, and Matthias Steup Part 1: Seemings and How They Justify 1. The Chemistry of Epistemic Justification
Matthias Steup 2. Seemings and Truth
Blake McAllister 3. Nonsubjectivism about How Things Seem
Matthew McGrath 4. Against the Phenomenal View of Evidence: Disagreement and Shared Evidence
Elizabeth Jackson 5. Appearances and the Problem of Stored Beliefs
Scott Stapleford and Kevin McCain 6. Emotions as Evidence for Evaluations
Earl Conee and Richard Feldman 7. How to Be Irrational
Michael Huemer Part 2: Seemings in Inference and Inquiry 8. Dogmatism, Seemings, and Non-Deductive Inferential Justification
Berit Brogaard and Dimitria Electra Gatzia 9. Inference Without the Taking Condition
Declan Smithies 10. Zetetic Seemings and Their Role in Inquiry
Verena Wagner 11. Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry
John Bengson Part 3: Seemings and Perception 12. Veridical Perceptual Seemings
Elijah Chudnoff 13. Perceptual Seemings and Perceptual Learning
Harmen Ghijsen 14. Phenomenal Explanationism and the Look of Things
Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti Part 4: Intellectual Seemings and Intuitions 15. A Priori vs. A Posteriori Justification: The Central Role of Rational Intuitions
Bruce Russell 16. Thought Experiments as Tools of Theory Clarification
Grace Helton 17. Lessons from Commonsensism for Religious Epistemology
Michael Bergmann
About the author
Kevin McCain is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. He has authored and edited several works in epistemology and philosophy of science including the following from
Routledge: Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification (2014),
Epistemology: 50 Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Thought Experiments (2021),
What is Scientific Knowledge? An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology of Science (with Kostas Kampourakis, 2019),
Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles (with Scott Stapleford, 2020), and
Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (with Scott Stapleford and Matthias Steup, 2021).
Scott Stapleford is Professor of Philosophy at St. Thomas University in Fredericton, Canada. His publications for Routledge include
Logic Works: A Rigorous Introduction to Formal Logic (with Lorne Falkenstein and Molly Kao, 2022),
Hume's Enquiry: Expanded and Explained (with Tyron Goldschmidt, 2021),
Berkeley's Principles: Expanded and Explained (with Tyron Goldschmidt, 2016), and two edited collections:
Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (with Kevin McCain and Matthias Steup, 2021) and
Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles (with Kevin McCain, 2020).
Matthias Steup received his PhD from Brown University in 1985. He is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder, and the author of
An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (1996) and numerous articles in epistemology. He is the editor of
Knowledge, Truth and Duty (2001) and co-editor of
Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2005, 2014),
A Companion to Epistemology (2010), and
Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (Routledge, 2021).
