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The great Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, in his classic
On War, introduced the idea of friction in war. Friction was one of the most important ideas that Clausewitz put forward. His application of the term is generally taken to be limited to events on the field of battle. But had Clausewitz lived to the end of the 20th century, he undoubtedly would have broadened his understanding of friction to include the nexus between war and policy making. He would have done so because his most fundamental insight, apart from the significance of friction in war, was his insistence upon the priority of policy over war.
Cimbala applies the concept of friction to a number of 20th century cases of war and policy making. He also applies it to some plausible scenarios for the next century. Although many U.S. military planners and policy makers appear to place their faith in technology as the sine qua non of success in security and defense policy, technology can be self defeating and myopic if political and strategic vision are lacking. For example, the mindless pursuit of information warfare in all its varieties may convince potential U.S. opponents that infowar is a cost effective way of negating U.S. military power. A provocative analysis for scholars, students, military professionals and other policy makers involved with strategy and military policy issues.
List of contents
Introduction
Case One: Friction in Irrelevant and Inflexible War Plans
Case Two: Friction in Nuclear Crisis Management
Case Three: Failure Amid Success: Desert Storm and Friction
Case Four: Small Wars, Faux Wars and Peace Operations: Sources of Friction
Case Five: Deterrence and Friction
Case Six: Mass Destruction and Information Warfare: Friction in Collision
Conclusion
About the author
Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works in the fields of national security studies, nuclear arms control and other fields, including Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing (with P. K. Forster, Ashgate, 2010). An award winning Penn State teacher, Dr. Cimbala has consulted for various U.S. government agencies and defense contractors.
STEPHEN J. CIMBALA is Professor of Political Science at Penn State University, Delaware County. He has contributed to the literature of international relations and U.S. security and defense policy for more than 20 years, and he has written or edited more than 30 books. Among his latest publications are Collective Insecurity (Greenwood, 1995) and Clinton and Post-Cold War Defense (Praeger, 1996). In addition, Cimbala serves on the editorial review boards of several journals, including Armed Forces and Society.
