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Klappentext This book by one of the world’s foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation! explanation! prediction and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made ‘for the sake of argument’ sometimes conflict with our beliefs! and when they do! some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such belief contravention! adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two types of nonmonotonic logic are the focus of this book. A detailed comparison of nonmonotonicity appropriate to both belief contravening and ampliative suppositional reasoning reveals important differences that have been overlooked. Zusammenfassung Professor Levi offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation! explanation! prediction and hypothesis testing. This major study will be required reading for all philosophers and logicians concerned with conditionals! decision theory and inductive inference. Inhaltsverzeichnis Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Unextended Ramsey tests; 3. Modality without modal ontology; 4. Aspects of conditional logic; 5. Nonmonotonicity in belief change and suppositional reasoning; 6. Inductive expansion; 7. Defaults; 8. Matters of degree; 9. Normality and expectation; 10. Agents and automata; Notes; Bibliography; Name index; Subject index.
