Mehr lesen
Informationen zum Autor Jane M. O. Sharp is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies in the International Policy Institute, Kings College London. She was formerly Senior Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and from 1998–2003 served as the British representative on the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. Klappentext This study shows that arms control agreements reflect rather than affect relations between the parties. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) codified parity between NATO and the Soviet-led Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in November 1990. CFE thus reflected the status quo at the end of the cold war, but the benefits were short lived, at least for Russia. Although still widely viewed in the west as the cornerstone of security and stability in post-Cold War Europe, from the Russian perspective CFE was soon overtaken by events. With the collapse of the WTO and the Soviet Union in 1991, it became impossible to talk of a military balance between east and west in Europe, especially as all the former WTO states opted for membership in NATO. The other state parties worked hard to adjust and adapt the treaty to meet Russian concerns about its new weakness relative to NATO, but three sets of issues complicated Russian acceptance of CFE limits. The first was NATO enlargement which, though not directed against Moscow, certainly underscored Russia's weakness relative to NATO. The second was Russia's heavy handed suppression of the Chechen independence movement, begun by Boris Yeltsin in 1994, which after September 11, 2001 President Putin rationalized as part of the global war on terrorism. Putin also used 9/11 as an excuse not to withdraw troops and equipment from Georgia a commitment made by Russia when the adapted CFE Treaty was signed in Istanbul in November 1999. The third was Russian opposition to increasingly aggressive US-led military operations in the post Cold War era: in the Balkans in the 1990s and against Iraq in 2003. Russia cooperated with the operationagainst the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002, but was increasingly concerned with what appeared to be permanent US military bases in central Asia. Zusammenfassung This study shows that arms control agreements reflect rather than affect relations between the parties, focusing on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) in 1990. Inhaltsverzeichnis Preface Acknowledgements Acronyms Part I. Background to the formal CFE negotiation 1. Arms Control as a Barometer of European Politics 2. Negotiating the CFE mandate Part II. Negotiating the treaty and assessing its impact 3. Formal Negotiations: March 1989 – November 1990 4. German Singularity, Nuclear Modernisation and the CFE–1A Agreement on Personnel Part III. Ratification problems 5. Resolving the Discrepancies in Soviet Data, 1990–91 6. The Dissolution of the USSR, 1991–92 Part IV. Implementation 7. Implementation of the CFE Treaty: The Cup Half Full 8. Implementation: the cup half empty—non-compliance with Article V Part V. The need for treaty revisions 9. Treaty revisions and NATO enlargement: the Flank Agreement 10. Adapting the CFE Treaty to post-cold war Europe, 1997-1999 11. Whither the Adapted CFE Treaty under President Putin? 12. Conclusion Appendices Index ...
